Sales -- Implied Warranty -- Cigarette Manufacturer\u27s Liability for Lung Cancer by Manning, Henry S., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 42 | Number 2 Article 18
2-1-1964
Sales -- Implied Warranty -- Cigarette
Manufacturer's Liability for Lung Cancer
Henry S. Manning Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henry S. Manning Jr., Sales -- Implied Warranty -- Cigarette Manufacturer's Liability for Lung Cancer, 42 N.C. L. Rev. 468 (1964).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol42/iss2/18
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
lingering, ominous cloud of illegality under the Robinson-Patman
Act.
JAMES M. TALLEY, JR.
Sales-Implied Warranty-Cigarette Manufacturer's
Liability for Lung Cancer
Plaintiff's decedent initiated suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida to recover damages for
personal injuries resulting from lung cancer allegedly incurred by
smoking Lucky Strike cigarettes. Shortly thereafter, he died from
this condition and this claim1 was consolidated with another brought
under the Florida wrongful death statute.' The district court sub-
mitted the case to the jury on theories of negligence and breach of
implied warranty.' In addition to rendering a general verdict for
defendant, the jury answered specific interrogatories4 to the effect
that the fatal lung cancer was proximately caused by the smoking of
Lucky Strikes and that, as of the time of the discovery of the cancer,
defendant could not by the reasonable application of human skill and
foresight have known of the danger to users of his product. Judg-
ment was entered for defendant, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed,5 holding defendant not liable as an in-
'Under Florida survival law, decedent's claim passed to the executor
of his estate. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.11 (Supp. 1962).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01, .02 (1959).
'The complaint asserted liability under six separate counts: breach of
implied warranty; breach of express warranty; negligence; misrepresenta-
tion; battery; and violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1958), the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77
(1958), and the Florida Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.01 (1962). The trial court directed verdict for defendant on all ex-
cept the implied warranty and negligence counts.
'The questions submitted and answered were: "(1) Did the decedent
Green have primary cancer in his leift'lung? [Answered, YES] ....
(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his
death? [Answered, YES] .... (3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike ciga-
rettes on the part of the decedent, Green, a proximate cause or one of the
proximate causes of the development of cancer in his left lung? [Answered,
YES] .... (4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by
the reasonable application of human skill and foresight have known that users
of Lucky Strike cigarettes, such as the decedent Green would be endangered,
by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes,
of contracting cancer of the lung? [Answered, NO] .... " Green v. Ameri-
can* Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71-72 (5th Cir. 1962).
' Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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surer under implied warranty for those consequences of the use of
his product "of which no developed human skill and foresight could
afford knowledge."' Petition for re-hearing was granted7 and the
legal question of absolute liability' was certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida.' That court found that the common law"0 of
Florida did impose absolute liability under the conditions posited
in the question for breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability." The knowledge of defendant, either actual or implied, of
the hazard of his product was held to be immaterial under this
theory.
Although this is the first time a plaintiff has succeeded at this
stage of cancer litigation against a cigarette manufacturer,' 2 the
6 Id. at 76.
"304 F.2d at 85.
'The question certified: "Does the law of Florida impose upon a manu-
facturer and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of im-
plied warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925
until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior to February 1,
1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the defendant manu-
facturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the
reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users
of such cigarettes would be endangered by the inhalation of the main stream
smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?" 304 F.2d
at 86. Note that the question is phrased in terms of the "reasonable" appli-
cation of human skill and foresight. This accords with the question as sub-
mitted to the jury, but seems to conflict with other language of the opinion.
See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, 63 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 515, 530, n.77 (1963), noting the inconsistency and offering the possible
explanation that where a product is for human consumption, "reasonable" ap-
plication of skill is equivalent to the absolute standard of the law of implied
warranty. Cf. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rep.
320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
' Pursuant to statutory certification procedure. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031
(1961).
The Uniform Sales Act has not been adopted in Florida.
x' Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
12 To date there have been six other decisions in cigarette-lung cancer
litigation. In none has plaintiff recovered. Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958), held that plaintiff was not in privity. Ross v.
Phillip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), modified, Civil No.
9494 (W.D. Mo. 1959), originally held that plaintiff was not in privity, but
the decision was modified in light of the subsequent holding of the Missouri
Supreme Court that privity is not required in Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A.
Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959). In Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829. (W.D. Pa. 1955), rev'd, 295 F.2d
292 (3d Cir. 1961), it was held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury on
the questions of negligence, implied warranty, and express warranty. See
note 36 infra. In Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th
1964]
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holding of the Florida court merely represents the extension of fa-
miliar principles of law to a new class of products. 8 There is no
novelty in the idea that a vendor's liability under the theory of im-
plied warranty turns upon whether or not the product is in fact un-
merchantable, rather than upon any consideration of defendant's
knowledge or the general foreseeability of the hazard involved.1 4 An
otherwise qualified plaintiff- is ordinarily able to make out his case
upon a showing that his injury resulted from a defect in the product
and that such defect was present when the product left the control
of the manufacturer. 5 Thus, the holdings of the court in the instant
case that "no reasonable distinction can.., be made between the
physical or practical impossibility"' 6 of obtaining knowledge of the
danger and that liability attaches where the product "is not in fact
merchantable"' 7 is not a surprising application of legal principles. In
Florida, then, liability is strictly imposed upon a manufacturer for
injuries caused by a substance in his product, the harmful propen-
sities of which were hitherto unsuspected even when the substance
is both common and natural to the entire generic class to which the
Cir. 1963), it was held that there is no warranty liability for unknowable
hazards. See text accompanying note 23 infra. The remaining two cases,
Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1961), and Mitchell v.
American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960), are not germane
to the present discussion.
" The principles are familiar in that Florida is one of an apparently in-
creasing number of jurisdictions which does not require privity in the food
cases. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TORTs, Explanatory Notes § 402A-1, 2
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) (listing twenty-four such jurisdictions). See gen-
erally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
suzer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-10 (1960). Although Dean Prosser's pri-
mary inquiry is into the problems posed by privity requirements, the im-
portance of this article as a starting point in any research into general con-
siderations of the law of implied warranty cannot be over-emphasized.
" See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 1961); Brown v. Globe Labs., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01 [1]
(1963); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN.
L. REv. 117 (1943).
"n Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1962); Athens Canning Co. v. Ballard, 365 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963). See also Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943). The argument has been advanced,
however, that imposition of such absolute and automatic liability in cases
where the product cannot be made free from defects is at least subject to
question. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, Op. cit. supra note 14, at § 16.01[l].
" Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla, 1963).
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product belongs. It is to such products as these that we direct pres-
ent attention; for here is a liability which, definitionally, is more
stringent even than "liability without fault." It imposes liability for
deviation from the perfect under circumstances in which perfection
is a scientific impossibility.'
8
Reluctance to saddle a class of defendants with liability of such
a nature could be expected and it is not surprising that much recent
attention has been focused on the problem. Courts and writers have
taken a new look at the rapidly expanding field of "products lia-
bility," particularly the warranty of merchantability, and have spec-
ulated as to whether its scope should be so broad as to impose
liability for every imperfect product and whether such defenses as
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should be avail-
able to the manufacturer.
The answers proposed have been as diverse as their proponents,
but there seems to be a strong feeling among most that the "war-
ranty" is -not one of perfection. Some argue that the warranty is
founded upon the presumed intent of the parties to the sale and that
it arises only because of the superior opportunity of the manufacturer
to discover and remedy defects before they can cause injury. Under
this view, they would find no liability for the carcinogens contained
in cigarettes, since the manufacturer cannot be said to warrant against
a totally unknown hazard.' 9 Another argument is that strict lia-
bility exists only for the foreseeable risks attending the use of the
product.2" The Fifth Circuit has applied this "foreseeability" limi-
18 Such liability may perhaps be justified in cases involving unexpected
effects of new drugs such as the tranquillizer thalidomide, the use of which
precipitated thousands of deformities in new-born infants. There would
necessarily have to be a balancing, of policy considerations militating in
favor of liability as a deterrant to premature marketing of such products
and opposed to its imposition on the theory that it would impede the de-
velopment of new products on the part of a liability-conscious manufacturer.
The "impediment to research" argument was rejected by the court in Gotts-
danker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rep. 320 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960). See 9 WAYNE L. Rnv. 383, 389-90 (1963).
" This is the rationale employed by some courts in denying liability of a
retail merchant for defective food in sealed containers. Scruggins v. Jones,
207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165
Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933). Williston argues that this view is opposed
both to the weight of authority and general principles of the common law.
1 WILLIsTON, SALEs, § 242 (rev. ed. 1948).
" See generally Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Torts,
7 No= DAME LAw. 468 (1932); 9 WAYNE L, Rev, 383 (1963).
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tation in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.21 There the court
said: "[T]here must be a foreseeability of harm.... [The manu-
facturer] is an insurer against foreseeable risks-but not against
unknowable risks."22 Still others take the position that liability is
limited to the harm which flows from the "contemplated use" of
the product, and defendant can avoid liability by proving to the jury
that plaintiff's use is excessive or otherwise "uncontemplated. '2 3
There are other views, equally well thought-out,24 but the great
majority of them share in contemplating some limitation on liability
21 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963). Construing Louisiana law, the court re-
jected defendant's contention that recovery of plaintiff, if any, must be based
on the statutory warranty against redhibitory vices (hidden defects). 317
F.2d at 29. It was held that there was in addition to this statutory warranty
another-of "wholesomeness"-implied by law, and that for breach of this
warranty, strict delictual (tortious) liability attached. 317 F.2d at 30. The
court found, however, that such liability had never been imposed even in the
food cases in Louisiana except where harm was a foreseeable consequence
of a defective condition. 317 F.2d at 35. It has been forcefully argued that
such a test as this frees the manufacturer from warranty liability unless he
is negligent. FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 16.03 [4] [a].
The Lartigue court quotes at length from the opinion which it rendered
in the Green case; and the holdings are very nearly indistinguishable. Both
apparently assume that the applicable warranty was breached, but condition
the resultant liability upon "knowledge of consequences" (Green) or "foresee-
ability of harm" (Lartigue).
22317 F.2d at 36-37.
" Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425
(1963) (material hoist used to carry passengers) ; Vincent v. Nicholas E.
Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N.E.2d 263 (1958) (beer can opener used
on glass jar). See also Weston, Contributory Negligence in Product Lia-
bility, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 424 (1963); Bushnell, Illusory Defense of
Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 412
(1963); 61 MICH. L. REv. 1180 (1963).
24 A product may not be legally defective until science discovers the dan-
ger. Suggested in Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16
FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 585, 594 (1961). Strict liability does not mean strict
liability; the former differs from negligence only in that specific acts of
negligence need not be proven, the latter is the kind imposed under work-
men's compensation and is not applicable in this area. Id. at 592-93. Goods
of first quality not required to satisfy the standard of "merchantability."
1 WILLISTON, SALES, § 243 (rev. ed. 1948). Warranty extends only to the
"reasonable expectations" of consumer. DICKERSON, PRODUcTs LIAIILITY
AND THE FOOD CONSUMER, §4.3 (1951). Substance not deleterious if "nat-
ural" to the product. Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144
(1936) (chicken bone in chicken pie); Brown v. Nebiker, 229 Iowa 1223,
296 N.W. 366 (1941) (sliver of pork bone in pork chop); Adams v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 251 N.C. 565, 112 S.E.2d 92 (1960) (crystallized
corn kernel in corn flakes). See concurring opinion of Goodrich, J., in
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
No liability for defect in an established product where defendant can have no
knowledge of risk. Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 515, 535 (1963).
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in this area. In addition, the majority also seems to be in agree-
ment on at least two essential points: first, that this is liability in
tort, not contract, and that the law would be well served by the
elimination of often misleading contractual language and concepts
from the area;25 and second, that while this new liability should be
strict in the sense that plaintiff need not prove negligence to justify
his recovery, it should not be strict in the sense that no defenses are
available.26
It is generally conceded that the defense of assumption of the
risk is applicable in actions brought under strict liability. Whether
the court denominates the liability as contractual
27 or tortious, 2 s
it is recognized that where plaintiff voluntarily and unnecessarily
proceeds in the face of a perceived risk, his recovery ought to be pre-
cluded. Of course, in cases such as Green, where there could have
been no recognition of the danger, the defense is obviously inap-
plicable, but there is no logical reason why it should not apply to
future plaintiffs-those who begin to use the product, or continue
to use it in a climate of general knowledge that its use is likely to
result in a given injury.29
The applicability of the defense of contributory negligence as a
bar to recovery in these suits is less clear. Courts, trapped in the
crippling concepts of contractual "warranty" are plainly reluctant
to allow the use of purely tort theories, 30 and are forced to adopt
" See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), supra note 13. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS,
§ 402A, question 5 at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 6 1961), explaining deletion of
word "warranty" from the section.
2 See generally 1 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at
§ 16.01[3].
"'E.g., Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Hawaii 1961), aff'd,
304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 200 N.C.
158, 16 S.E.2d 668 (1941). In a footnote to its opinion in Green, the Florida
court noted without comment that the question of assumption of the risk was
not raised in the case. 154 So. 2d at 170 n.2(a).
2 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 27 Cal. Rep.
697,377 P.2d 897 (1963) (by implication). See generally 1 FRUMER & FRIED-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 16A[3] [a]; Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), supra note 13 at 1148 n.290
(1960).
29 See generally PRoSsER, TORTS, § 55 (2d ed. 1955).
o But cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 27
Cal. Rep. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). This was the first court to describe
manufacturer's product liability as purely tortious. Cf. 1 FRumER & FRIE-
MAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 16A[2] (discussing implications of Green-
man).
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some other rationale such as "improper use"' to bar the recovery
of the undeserving plaintiff.32 There is an important line of cases,
to which later reference will be made, which permit proof of con-
tributory negligence as a defense to an award of consequential dam-
ages while refusing to allow its assertion in bar of the action."
Such is the state of the law today. The courts, despite their
instinctive dislike of extensive imposition of liability without fault,
are being gradually pushed ever farther along the path indicated
years ago in the MacPherson case. 4 The increasing complexities
of modern life have forced some fettering of the right to freely en-
gage in unrestricted enterprise. The imposition of absolute liability
in tort upon the manufacturer for all his products is the easily recog-
nizable trend.35 The Green decision is but indicative of this trend.
In fairness, it must be conceded that both plaintiff and defendant
in the cigarette cases can marshall equally valid and convincing
arguments in support of their respective positions. For the plaintiff
who took up smoking years ago, it might be contended that he was
"encouraged" to adopt the habit." Or, assuming no enticement, the
" Eg., Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.
2d 425 (1963); Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151
N.E.2d 263 (1958). See generally 1 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra
note 14, at §§ 16.01[3], 19.08[1].
" There are, however, cases which permit assertion of contributory negli-
gence even in the warranty context. Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193
Ill. App. 620 (1915); Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 13 Misc.
2d 33, 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Mun. Ct. 1958). Contra, Hansen v. Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939). See also Chapman v. Brown,
198 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962),
where the court viewed contributory negligence as inapplicable unless it
"practically amounts to an assumption of the risk." 198 F. Supp. at 86. See
generally Prosser, supra note 13, at 1147-48; Weston, supra note 23.
" Razey v. J. B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 94 N.Y.S. 59 (1905);
Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N.C. 158, 6 S.E.2d 668 (1941). The ra-
tionale as expressed by Williston: "If the buyer's own fault or negligence con-
tributed to the injury, as by using the goods with knowledge of their defects,
he cannot recover consequential damages, since such damages were under the
circumstances not proximately due to the breach of warranty." 3 WILLISTON,
SALES § 614b (rev. ed. 1948).
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
This case was the first to allow recovery from a remote vendor for pure
negligence, and without regard to privity. Although not concerned with
warranty, it is generally considered to be the landmark case in the area of
products liability.
" "The assault upon the citadel ... is proceeding in these days apace."
Prosser, supra note 13, at 1148.
" In the Pritchard case, the court discusses at length some of the adver-
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argument remains that defendant is in a better position to absorb and
pass on to the consuming public the losses occasioned by use
of his product.3 In favor of the "future" plaintiff referred to above,
it could be asserted that, notwithstanding the climate of general
knowledge in which he began to smoke, he could never, as a matter
of law, assume the risk that his use of a marketed product in its
intended manner would fatally injure him. Even if it were con-
clusively proven and announced. daily that smoking causes cancer, it
might still be argued that such public information should not in-
sulate a manufacturer who is deliberately, and for profit, flooding
the market-place with millions of potential killers.
Answering the first plaintiff above, defendant can righteously
maintain that the defect was an "unknowable" one; that chemically,
the defect was natural to and inseparable from the product; that
he merely processed the product and added nothing to it which might
cause injury; and that, while the standard of merchantability is ad-
mittedly higher than that of cori mefcial acceptability when products
destined for intimate human use are involved, it is still not an abso-
lute guarantee of perfection. He may further contend that, although
his position does enable him to pass his losses to the consuming
public, this argument is valid only so long as there are a limited
number of plaintiffs. As claims increase, his efforts to remain in
business by distributing the loss would necessarily drive him into
bankruptcy; and this, he can argue, is a result contrary to the policy
favoring the satisfaction of a legitimate public demand in a free
enterprise system. Each of these arguments can be as validly as-
serted against the "future" plaintiff; and to his claim, defendant
could also affirmatively plead assumption of the risk.
tising claims made by Liggett & Myers to the effect that smoking would
"make you feel better," and that in order to "PlAy Safe-Smoke Chesterfield."
295 F.2d at 297. The court thought that a jury might find therein an express
warranty, and reversed the directed verdict for defendant on this and other
grounds. Ibid. The second trial ended in a verdict for defendant, the jury
finding in answer to special interrogatories (1) That there had been no ex-
press warranty, (2) nor a breach of the warranty implied by law. They did
expressly find that plaintiff had assunzed the risk. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1962, p. 27, col. 1.
" See the famous concurring opinion of Traynor, C. J., in Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d. 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). Dean
Prosser indicates that there has been a growing acceptance of the rationale
even by some critics who initially denounced it as socialistic. Prosser, supra
note 13, at 1120. See generally PRossER, op. cit. supra note 29, § 56.
1964]
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The likelihood of legislation outlawing the sale of cigarettes and
their relegation to the present status of opiates seems slight, at least
in the foreseeable future. Thus, unless science is able to afford a cure
for cancer, the problem will be a continuing one. The courts, sensing
this, have been understandably reluctant to open the way for the
flood of litigation which is certain to follow the first successful plain-
tiff. But relief of some kind must eventually be granted, and the
time for serious consideration of the alternatives is at hand. Sev-
eral possibilities suggest themselves.
First, of course, the legislature might grant statutory exemption
from liability to this class of manufacturer, though it seems unlikely
from a public policy standpoint. Or, courts could accept the Green
rationale, and permit recovery in cases where defendant is unable to
assert assumption of the risk. This will subject manufacturers to an
immediate inundation of suits by "old" users. The privity require-
ments"8 and similar barriers30 prevalent in many states would serve
to hold early recoveries down to some extent; and by the time the
tort concept of the action achieves more general acceptance, most
plaintiffs will be members of an "assuming" class. Losses might
thus be distributed to the public with only a temporary requirement
of a prohibitive price increase. Again, the situation might be solved
by the manufacturers themselves. If they become convinced that
plaintiffs will be more and more successful as time passes, they might
direct their efforts toward limiting the award of damages. They
would thus admit their liability and seek, through legislation, some
form of regulated award similar to that now in effect in the area of
workmen's compensation. In light of the historical trend toward
ever-higher damage verdicts they might, by conceding liability now,
avoid terrific loses in the future.
"' North Carolina, for example, still requires privity for maintenance of
an action on implied warranty, despite a strong dictum in Davis v. Radford,
233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951), to the contrary. Our latest pronounce-
ment indicates that no change is impending. Wyatt v. North Carolina Equip-
ment Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960).
" Discussion of the other "barriers" in plaintiff's path is beyond the scope
of this note. Throughout, it has been assumed that plaintiff was "otherwise
qualified," and no attempt has been made to treat problems such as privity,
proof of causation, effect of disclaimers, survival of the action, the require-
ment of service of adequate notice of breach to defendant, nor those related
to the statute of limitations. Each could easily be the subject of a separate
note or comment. The present effort has simply been an attempt to critically
view the destination toward which the current law seems inevitably bound.
[Vol. 42
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As the matter now stands, courts seem too concerned with abso-
lutes. Both opinions in the Green case arrived at "total" resolutions
of the question of liability-each diametrically opposed to the other.
Neither recognized that, if all parties are to be justly treated, the
situation is one which demands compromise. It is submitted that the
best solution lies in judicial acceptance of the logic implicit in Wil-
liston's statement regarding the award of consequential damages."
For out-of-pocket expenses occasioned by use of a product, un-
merchantable due to some common class defect, the courts should
allow virtually automatic recovery. The question of damages be-
yond this amount, however, should be treated as a matter for sep-
arate consideration. So treated, this recovery should either be denied
outright, or at the very least be deemed subject to a counter-attack
by the manufacturer utilizing the classic tort defenses of contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk.4
HENRY S. MANNING, JR.
Torts-Employer's Duty to Infant Independent Contractor
In a recent Pennsylvania case,' the administratrix of the estate
of a deceased thirteen year old boy brought a wrongful death and
survival action against the boy's employer, a newspaper publisher.
The administratrix charged that the defendant was negligent in
"that it permitted and caused him to travel a dangerous route in
close proximity to a busy highway with a newspaper bag over his
shoulders containing approximately 75 newspapers .... ." In an
effort to avoid the effect of the workmen's compensation statute it
was alleged that the deceased had been employed as an independent
contractor. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. It contended that
the characterization of deceased as an independent contractor was an
admission that defedant had no control over the means by which the
deceased accomplished his work and therefore it owed him no duty.
However, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
• See note 33 supra.
"See cases cited note 24 supra. See also 36 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 490 (1963)
(reaching essentially the same conclusion).
'Swartz v. Eberly, 212 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
2 Id. at 33.
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